Role-based ecosystem for the design, development, and deployment of secure multi-party data analytics applications by Lapets, Andrei et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Computer Science BU Open Access Articles
2019
Role-based ecosystem for the
design, development, and
deployment of secure multi-pa...
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Andrei Lapets, Kinan Dak Albab, Rawane Issa, Lucy Qin, Mayank
Varia, Azer Bestavros, Frederick Jansen. 2019. "Role-Based
Ecosystem for the Design, Development, and Deployment of Secure
Multi-Party Data Analytics Applications." 2019 IEEE Cybersecurity
Development (SecDev). https://doi.org/10.1109/SecDev.2019.00023
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/40717
Boston University
Role-Based Ecosystem for the Design,
Development, and Deployment of Secure
Multi-Party Data Analytics Applications
Andrei Lapets, Kinan Dak Albab, Rawane Issa, Lucy Qin, Mayank Varia, Azer Bestavros, Frederick Jansen
Boston University, 111 Cummington Mall, Boston, MA USA 02215
Email: {lapets, babman, ra1issa, lucyq, varia, best, fjansen}@bu.edu
Abstract—
Software applications that employ secure multi-party com-
putation (MPC) can empower individuals and organizations to
benefit from privacy-preserving data analyses when data sharing
is encumbered by confidentiality concerns, legal constraints,
or corporate policies. MPC is already being incorporated into
software solutions in some domains; however, individual use cases
do not fully convey the variety, extent, and complexity of the
opportunities of MPC. This position paper articulates a role-
based perspective that can provide some insight into how future
research directions, infrastructure development and evaluation
approaches, and deployment practices for MPC may evolve.
Drawing on our own lessons from existing real-world deploy-
ments and the fundamental characteristics of MPC that make
it a compelling technology, we propose a role-based conceptual
framework for describing MPC deployment scenarios. Our
framework acknowledges and leverages a novel assortment of
roles that emerge from the fundamental ways in which MPC pro-
tocols support federation of functionalities and responsibilities.
Defining these roles using the new opportunities for federation
that MPC enables in turn can help identify and organize the
capabilities, concerns, incentives, and trade-offs that affect the
entities (software engineers, government regulators, corporate
executives, end-users, and others) that participate in an MPC
deployment scenario. This framework can not only guide the
development of an ecosystem of modular and composable MPC
tools, but can make explicit some of the opportunities that
researchers and software engineers (and any organizations they
form) have to differentiate and specialize the artifacts and services
they choose to design, develop, and deploy. We demonstrate how
this framework can be used to describe existing MPC deployment
scenarios, how new opportunities in a scenario can be observed
by disentangling roles inhabited by the involved parties, and how
this can motivate the development of MPC libraries and software
tools that specialize not by application domain but by role.
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organizations face a tension between har-
nessing the power of data and the liability associated with
the possession or potential exposure of that data, leading to
lost opportunities in data analysis and the consequent benefits
thereof. Software systems and applications that employ secure
multi-party computation (MPC), a cryptographic technique
that allows independent parties to jointly compute a shared
result without revealing their private inputs to the parties
performing the computation, can empower individuals and
organizations to benefit from privacy-preserving computations
over data in contexts where data sharing is limited by confi-
dentiality concerns, legal constraints, or corporate policies.
In the near future, academic and industry organizations will
begin drawing from a rich body of existing work on MPC
to develop and implement novel software tools, systems, and
platforms. These will in turn enable individuals, researchers,
businesses, government agencies, and policymakers to use
modern frameworks and development environments to build
and deploy applications that allow cooperating parties to
compute analytics over data belonging to multiple entities
without the expense, liability, or privacy loss associated with
contributors submitting that data to a single trusted entity.
Real-world applications enabled by such an infrastructure can
empower their users by allowing for new forms of collabora-
tive data analysis.
MPC has been an active area of cryptography research for
more than 35 years [1]–[4]. The past decade has seen intense
focus on improving MPC algorithms and designing MPC
frameworks that perform quickly enough on domain-specific
functions likely to be of interest in practice [5]–[9]. Due to
these efforts, MPC is starting to become a mature technology
that is ripe for transition to practice in appropriate application
domains: real-world deployments of MPC are accumulating,
and it is clear that domain-specific solutions can have the
requisite performance and usability properties that drive (or
at least do not hinder) adoption of MPC. However, we can
envision that at some inflection point, researchers, practition-
ers, organizations, and entrepreneurs will see opportunities to
create more general solutions.
The opportunities and benefits associated with the use of
MPC techniques can be subtle, highly sensitive to context,
unfamiliar, and counterintuitive to the full range of stakehold-
ers: software engineers, government regulators, corporate ex-
ecutives, end-users, and others. While acceptable performance
within the target domain is a necessary requirement for adop-
tion of MPC, it is by no means sufficient when considering the
broader deployment context [10], [11]. To address the concerns
of all stakeholders, performance, scalability, and modularity
of techniques and functionalities can ensure the means, but
all key players must also have the incentive and capability
to use these techniques. Basic research alone cannot (and
should not, given the potentially limited resources of research
communities) address all of these challenges.
If other individuals and organizations wish to contribute
to the development of MPC (and if those in the research
community wish to support and encourage them to do so), how
can they motivate and organize their contributions? Modularity
through domain specialization provides one natural answer, but
this may lead to lost opportunities for reuse of knowledge,
reuse of code, and exploitation of heterogeneities and asym-
metries among stakeholders that occur in multiple domains.
Such an approach may also overlook opportunities and incen-
tives for those who wish to (inevitably) build and contribute
general-purpose solutions that cut across domains. Through
our deployment efforts, we have observed an orthogonal way
to introduce modularity: via specialization of roles that entities
can inhabit within MPC deployment scenarios.
Our explicit focus on roles may in some ways look familiar
to practitioners within the broader cybersecurity domain [12].
However, the manner in which roles are incorporated into
our proposed framework differs from past work: the primary
reason that an entity inhabits a role in our framework is to
identify how it enables the federation (via MPC) of some
functionality or responsibility (and not, unless by coincidence
or implication, to identify its capabilities or responsibilities
with relation to disclosure or integrity). At a higher level,
the purpose of introducing roles is also distinct from that of
previous work: we argue that our role-based approach provides
a novel way to explicitly identify, articulate, and motivate
future directions for research and development efforts that
incorporate MPC technologies and software solutions.
Secure MPC as an Accessible Service: Compelling real-
world uses of MPC are numerous; applications include anal-
ysis of pay inequities [10], disease surveillance [13], satellite
collision prevention [14], tax fraud detection [15], electricity
trading markets [16], scientific discovery [17], genomics [18],
and global advanced persistent threat identification in corpo-
rate network data [19].
Despite a small number of successful deployments of MPC
for social good in areas such as tax fraud detection [15],
the impact of MPC has mostly remained limited to proof-
of-concept studies. Adoption of MPC is in part hindered
by the fact that the existing frameworks are engineered to
optimize for metrics that are not sufficient on their own to
drive adoption in practice. Many efforts compete on com-
putational performance for small-scale data (a domain in
which all modern frameworks are adequate [20]) while not
addressing human-scale performance costs: tools require users
to become familiar with new domain-specific languages, to set
up compatible hardware infrastructures, or to understand and
appreciate the benefits of counterintuitive trust relationships.
These circumstances can be burdensome for software engi-
neers, administrators, and non-technical stakeholders.
Lessons learned from experiences in creating and success-
fully deploying MPC solutions for concrete applications reflect
an emphasis on a domain-specific solutions for a particular
deployment scenario; as expressed by others in the community
[21]: “Secure computation is a general scheme; in reality one
has to choose an application, starting from a very real business
need, and build the solution from the problem itself choosing
the right tools, tuning protocol ideas into a reasonable solution,
balancing security and privacy needs vs. other constraints:
legal, system setting, etc.” We also agree with the assertion
[21] that only after a solution addresses a concrete need is
it appropriate to “Understand, employ, and generalize useful
routines: Building more general routines and secure computa-
tion software packages of actual business value may, therefore,
be a result of collecting various examples of actual useful
deployments first, and then creating a common API/software
packages based on actual use and experience, in a bottom
up fashion.” But in what ways is it possible to generalize
solutions? Once numerous solutions exist, how do we expect
the MPC landscape to develop into the future? With a desire
to extrapolate from these sentiments and motivated by an
examination of successful deployments, we propose a model
that will help us (and others) envision and proceed into this
next stage, as well as to replicate such successful sequences
for new use cases and new concrete needs.
Our Vision: This position paper proposes a vision that
consists of a conceptual framework for analyzing and ex-
ploiting the various heterogeneities and asymmetries in roles,
concerns, incentives, and resources/capabilities of parties par-
ticipating in MPC. We believe that MPC frameworks and
tools can allow cryptographers and software engineers to
consciously and deliberately encode these various roles within
complex MPC software systems. Such tools can then be
explicitly designed to assist the different parties (with varying
technical capabilities) in designing, developing, and deploy-
ing these systems. Our proposed conceptual framework is
informed by–and contextualizes–a number of criteria that must
be satisfied to enable a successful MPC deployment. This is
due to the fact that our vision is informed and motivated by
our own experiences in overcoming obstacles to adoption and
deployment while building MPC applications [10], [11], [22]–
[24], by the identification of new applications for MPC via
the disentangling of roles [25], by insights from deployment
efforts undertaken by other groups, and by the rich variety of
approaches to secure MPC found in related research efforts.
II. EXISTING APPROACHES IN RELATED WORK
This position paper draws on prior work to advocate that
developers of MPC libraries, systems, and applications target-
ing real-world scenarios and practical settings should adopt a
particular design perspective. We briefly review related efforts
in developing MPC frameworks, deploying MPC applications
in the real world, and addressing usability and deployability
of applications that utilize MPC.
The past few years have seen several successful deploy-
ments of MPC [26]–[28]. Further, an array of software frame-
works is available. These range from proprietary implemen-
tations [7], [29] to open-source, proof-of-concept work [6],
[8], [9], [30]–[34]. Available frameworks vary not only in
software maturity, security guarantees, and APIs but also in the
roles that parties must inhabit to participate, the requirements
that can be satisfied, and the communication topology of the
participating parties. We note that these frameworks are often
designed with a specific setting in mind, and make a variety
of implicit assumptions about the concerns, incentives, and
capabilities of participating parties. This leads to restrictions
on the various roles that a party is allowed to inhabit, or the
interactions it is allowed to perform, which may diverge from
many interesting real world settings. These restrictions also
apply to many recent highly-engineered MPC protocols [35]–
[38] that exploit properties of the specific setting for which
they are designed to increase efficiency or achieve desired
properties.
Most frameworks do not clearly distinguish between com-
pute parties, data analysts, data contributors, and policy ex-
perts. However, two predominant communication models can
be identified: (1) peer-to-peer frameworks in which all partic-
ipating parties are connected to each other and are required
to install the MPC framework locally on their own computing
infrastructure to participate, and (2) client-server frameworks
in which there is a central server running an installation of
the MPC framework while the other parties are mutually
unreachable, web-based clients. This distinction most closely
relates to the features of our proposed framework and is of
particular interest with regard to accessibility of deployed
MPC solutions. We examine some of the frameworks avail-
able in each category and highlight some feature-enhancing
opportunities and adaptation challenges to be addressed in
incorporating these frameworks into the proposed ecosystem.
Peer-to-peer: The majority of existing MPC frameworks
follow the peer-to-peer communication model. Among these,
most frameworks are open-source research prototypes [6],
[8], [9], [30]–[34]. In many cases, the framework’s authors
explicitly discourage use in production [6], [8], [9], [31],
[34]; furthermore, in these frameworks all participating parties,
including contributors, must deploy the software framework on
mutually available servers that remain online for the duration
of the protocol execution [30], [32], [33], [39]. The proprietary
frameworks [7], [29] are closed-source, which does not allow
for auditing by the public (auditability is one of the criteria
defined in section IV-A for successful MPC deployments). It
is important to note that there is a variation of the peer-to-peer
model [7] that enhances usability by distinguishing between
the role of a contributor and service provider. In this model
contributors secret-share their input data among multiple ser-
vice providers via the browser. The service providers then
jointly compute the required analytics over the secret-shared
data.
Client-server: In the client-server model one entity ef-
fectively acts as a service provider while the analyst and
contributors can be viewed as resource-constrained clients.
Unfortunately, this setting has received far less attention in
the community and available frameworks are sparse [40],
[41]. The work by Schro¨pfer et al. [40] is a web-based
implementation of Yao’s garbled circuit scheme that allows
two browser clients to perform a secure two-party compu-
tation leveraging a web server for communication and code
delivery. The framework is closed-source and restricted to
two parties. Canon-MPC [41] offers a web-based system that
supports MPC with symmetric binary functions. Each partic-
ipant registers an account on the system, can start a session
by choosing a symmetric binary function, and can indicate
which other registered users are contributors. The contributors
evaluate the agreed-upon function with the aid of a service
provider. Each contributor interacts with the service provider
exactly once, simultaneously submitting data and performing
part of the computation. At the end of the computation the
contributors receive the outcome of the function. While Canon-
MPC addresses many of the shortcomings of the traditional
peer-to-peer model, it falls short of meeting several usability
requirements that we will introduce in Section IV: auditability
(the cryptographic library is delivered as a compiled binary
and runs in Google’s proprietary NativeClient), accessibility
(only Google Chrome is supported because of the reliance on
NativeClient; Google has also indicated it ceased development
on NativeClient [42]), asynchronicity (while participants do
not have to enter data in any particular order, no two partic-
ipants can access the system at the same time; this does not
scale past a few participants), and idempotence (data cannot
be corrected after submission). Furthermore, we remark that if
not all contributors submit their data, a second pass is required
to finish the session. Importantly, Canon-MPC does not distin-
guish between the contributor and service provider roles: any
party that contributes data must also actively participate in the
computation. In terms of usability this is, in a sense, a step
backwards from the model adopted in peer-to-peer frameworks
such as Sharemind, which do distinguish between contributors
and service providers. Minimizing the participation effort for
contributors and increasing the robustness of the platform
to contributors failing or neglecting to participate can be
crucial as it addresses the fact that, in some deployment
scenarios, contributors only have weak incentive to contribute
data. At the same time, it may be natural to expect more
active and reliable involvement from the analysts since these
parties directly benefit from a successful completion of the
computation.
The underlying implicit assumptions in these frameworks
motivate our discussion of the role-based framework in the
next section, where these assumptions are made explicit and
configurable by the various participating parties. An MPC
system should allow solutions to reflect and utilize these asym-
metries in a deployment scenario, and to assist in choosing the
optimal primitives and protocols used in the system [43].
III. ROLE-BASED FRAMEWORK
Transitioning MPC techniques to practice in a way that
drives adoption necessitates a multi-faceted approach that
begins well before software engineering efforts commence.
MPC’s social benefits cannot be realized unless the decision
makers that ultimately choose to adopt MPC (i.e., executives,
directors, and legal advisors) have a clear and confident under-
standing of exactly what role they (and other entities) play in
the process, as well as how MPC protects their sensitive data
and mathematically guarantees compliance with data sharing
restrictions. Once a solution is accepted, it should ideally be
easily and rapidly deployable at little or no cost, and should
not necessitate changes to existing infrastructures and internal
data-management processes (e.g., the various schemas that
participants use internally). Finally, it should in all aspects
support the needs of the users who interact with the solution.
One way to introduce MPC capabilities into practical sce-
narios in a manageable way is to separate existing func-
tionalities into distinct, modular, reusable, and composable
components. These components should individually satisfy
concrete needs identified by early adopters of MPC facing
real-world use cases. These can then be generalized through
incorporation of alternative and complementary techniques and
software systems found in the literature. Finally, they can be
applied in the construction and deployment of novel MPC-
based solutions.
When examining a deployment scenario, it is critical to eval-
uate the roles that various parties take on, what their concerns
are, what incentives exists for each party to participate, and
their capabilities (as enumerated in Table I).
Roles Concerns Incentives Resources
Decision Maker Cost Legal Compliance Web Browser
Policy Expert Security Business Need Web Server
Data Contributor Privacy Data Access Database
Programmer Liability Compensation Cloud Service
Data Analyst Reputation CDN
Recipient Usability
Storage Service Participation
Compute Service Correctness
Code Auditor
Code Distributor
TABLE I
ROLES AND DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST TO PARTICIPATING PARTIES
A. Roles.
An effective infrastructure should have functionalities subdi-
vided into distinct roles (see Figure 1) that might be inhabited
by different agents (such as servers, mobile devices, desktops,
human users, organizations, and so on) within a broader con-
text. In a given MPC solution, each agent can inhabit multiple
roles. We advocate for a clean separation of the duties and
functionalities that may be required for an MPC application
into roles that are distinct, modular, and composable. Together,
we can view all these as being supported by an ecosystem
of interdependent and interacting software (and potentially
hardware) solutions.
The design of ecosystem components (including libraries
and applications) can be organized around these roles, and
should not predetermine which roles the agents (i.e., servers,
devices, application instances, and human users) must inhabit.
Ultimately, functionalities can then be exposed via a frame-
work and API as roles that are coupled with information about
which agents can inhabit those roles and which needs they
satisfy. We enumerate some of the roles we have identified (ac-
knowledging that there may be others) and note in a scenario
each agent may inhabit more than one role simultaneously.
• A decision maker makes informed decisions on behalf
of organizations and businesses and in return increases
the willingness of participants to contribute their sensitive
data. Decision makers must first gain confidence in the
technologies proposed, appreciate that it would impose
no significant burdens on their staff and infrastructure,
and be assured that features such as idempotence and
asynchrony would make deployment logistically feasible
and likely to produce meaningful results.
• A policy expert can provide expertise on how to specify
appropriate policies over the data schema (e.g., given
legal restrictions, best practices, or constraints chosen by
the data contributors). The policy expert may have the
expertise to participate in the development of an appli-
cation, or may have no such expertise and would require
an accessible way to express policies on contributed data
that the application would then enforce.
• A data contributor is the user (an individual or an
organization) of an application that supplies the sensitive
data to be analyzed. Note that the data contributor may
not know in advance the particular analyses that others
may want to apply to the contributed data (in other words,
any policies the data contributor may be able to specify
may be analysis-agnostic at the time the data is being
contributed). Note also that a contributor may not have
the sophistication necessary to deploy virtual machines
or servers when participating in a protocol (for example,
it may be an individual using a mobile device or a web
browser).
• A data analyst (often the same as the result recipient)
specifies the analytics to be computed on data. This is
normally done by an analyst with full knowledge of the
schema of the data, but not necessarily with advance
knowledge about who owns the data or what data sharing
constraints apply to that data (in other words, the data
analyst’s algorithm specification may be policy-agnostic).
• The recipient is the party that receives the result of com-
puting the secure multi-party analytic. Only recipients can
benefit from the result of the computation, but different
parties may receive different kinds of information (e.g.,
an individual user might only have access to information
about how their own metrics stack up against other users,
while a service provider might see aggregate metrics
across all users). As before, the recipient may not have
sophisticated hardware, software, or technical expertise.
• A compute service has the capacity to deploy and main-
tain computational resources to allow analytics to be
computed (e.g., on data that may already be secret-
shared). Once again, for simple applications, the service
provider may only have a mobile device or web browser
to contribute; in more complex scenarios, the service
provider maybe be a large organization or even an entire
cloud provider. Such a service provider may also act as
a proxy or aid for data contributors or analysts that have
limited resources [44].
• A code auditor verifies the correctness of the code to be
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Fig. 1. An instance of the ecosystem that includes a collection of entities, the roles they inhabit, and the workflows that exist among them; a distinction is
made between the design/development stage during which entities agree on the solution, and the deployment stage during which it is executed.
executed by compute services and data contributors, and
must participate in additional mechanisms for ensuring
integrity of delivered code.
• A code distributor makes available the actual application
(or the specification of the particular computation) to be
executed by compute parties on data provided by the
data contributors. Since the integrity of the computation
(and its conformance to the policy specialist’s constraints)
relies on the trustworthiness of the delivery mechanism,
it should be possible to federate trust among code dis-
tributors [45] by allowing multiple entities to inhabit this
role.
B. Concerns.
Within the ecosystem, entities have varying concerns that
must be accounted for from design to deployment. These
concerns may span between roles, be unique to a single entity,
and change depending on the use case. Properly addressing
them can reduce the barrier to participation and enhance
trust that each entity is carrying out their role properly.
The disentangling of roles may also create new opportunities
to exploit trade-offs between competing concerns (e.g., data
contributors with limited computing resources need not be
computing parties), or to turn concerns into incentives by
taking advantage of market competition (e.g., an organization
with a lower liability profile than others may choose to take
on additional liability and enhance the performance of a
computation by operating on data in the clear).
• Cost in terms of efficiency, deployment expenses, and
efforts required by users and analysts to learn and use
the application (including any schema transformation or
internal data collection and curation). Various trade-offs
in costs can be tailored to account for different kinds of
use cases.
• Security concerns may disincentivize participation if no
guarantee is made to certify that only users with the
correct privileges may have access to different pieces of
computational data and to ensure that no malicious user
may influence the result of the computation.
• Privacy may be vital in the scenario and is the key criteria
that may call for its use in a scenario.
• Usability dictates that a successful deployment should
not assume that data contributors and data analysts have
any knowledge of MPC. Therefore usability needs to be
emphasized in all design choices to lower the barrier
to participation as much as is possible. For MPC to
be widely adopted, the platforms developed need to be
intuitively understood by users and mimic workflows
that users are already familiar with. Facilitating the
user through simple contribution processes and proactive
error-handling can also help ensure correctness.
• Correctness is critical for the legitimacy of the application
and a shared concern among many parties as it may
impact the reputation of various entities. It is also critical
for the data analyst, in particular, for the integrity of the
a deployment.
• Participation from entities in the ecosystem is critical for
any well-designed architecture. Each entity must fulfill
their respective roles during deployment. Even though
clear instructions are made, data contributors may drop
out of participating while the application is deployed.
Managing incentives is crucial to maintaining a mean-
ingful level of participation, thus enhancing the privacy
and integrity of the final results.
• Liability concerns impede participation if the security
guarantees of MPC are not well understood by all.
Compute services may be hesitant to be a conduit for
data if there are potential legal risks.
• The reputation of various entities may be staked to the
success of an MPC deployment. These concerns can drive
incentives and also prevent against malicious behavior
such as colluding with other parties to reconstruct data.
It may also influence participation and disincentivize data
contributors who are concerned about the impact to their
reputation based on the results. Choices should be made
with the consideration of what is at stake and for whom
to navigate the incentives around proper role fulfillment.
C. Incentives.
Different parties often have several different incentives to
participate in an MPC computation, these incentives are often
closely related to the party’s role, and may provide insight
into the expectations of the party, and what it can be trusted
to do (e.g., which parties it is most trusted not to collude
with). Our ecosystem can leverage the asymmetry in these
incentives to encourage participation, increase trust in the
system, and improve efficiency. The ecosystem can perform
as a marketplace, creating new incentives and magnifying
existing ones. We discuss this in greater details in section
IV-D.
D. Resources and Capabilities.
Capabilities will vary for each use case but the core
resources that may be needed include web browser, web
server, database, cloud service, and content distribution net-
work (CDN). It is worthwhile to determine which entities can
provide each of these resources while in the design phase.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE ROLES FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE
In our work developing and deploying MPC solutions, there
has been a need to satisfy a number of concrete criteria that are
derived from the constraints imposed by target users (including
their level of technical literacy, their access to appropriate
kinds of IT infrastructure, and their logistical constraints). We
note that some of these needs may need to be met in order to
satisfy more general, overarching goals or to provide essential
incentives (such as improving usability to drive adoption by a
greater number of participants).
A. Criteria For Successful MPC Deployment.
We enumerate a number of these criteria, explicitly referenc-
ing how they relate back to the roles described in Section III.
• Comprehensibility: To drive initial adoption, either the
MPC protocols themselves or the novel secure comput-
ing opportunities they introduce must be straightforward
enough to explain so that decision-makers and users who
might not possess technical expertise can be confident
that they understand their operation or, at least, their
security guarantees. This is most important for data
contributors and policy experts, who are responsible for
deciding whether participation in a protocol is appropri-
ate, desirable, and safe.
• Auditability: To inspire trust, applications must have
complete transparency, with open-source code and/or
support for outside auditing. In most cases, those most
closely involved with a particular application (analysts,
contributors, and policy experts) will not possess the
resources to inspect source code or perform auditing over
the entire application stack. However, this presents an
opportunity for those in the code distributor role (e.g.,
cloud distribution networks may choose to offer this as a
service coupled with application delivery).
• Accessibility: To minimize any hurdles that might dis-
courage participation by data contributors and data an-
alysts, solutions must be easily and rapidly deployable,
requiring no setup, specialized software, specialized hard-
ware, or public Internet addresses for agents behind
firewalls. The way that compute service providers, code
distributors, brokers, and the communications medium are
incorporated can all have an effect on an application’s
accessibility.
• Simplicity: The software must be usable within a rela-
tively narrow time window by non-expert human con-
tributors and data analysts whose technical expertise may
only include basic familiarity with common software
applications.
• Asynchronicity: Agents only need to be online while
actively performing relevant tasks (i.e., not throughout the
duration of a protocol’s operation). This would primarily
apply to data analysts and data contributors, and may
be enabled through the inclusion of compute service
providers.
• Idempotence: Contributors must be able to resubmit (i.e.,
update) their data if they discover the data they submitted
was corrupted (either through human error, through a
software application failure, or both).
• Non-commitment: Contributors may decide not to partic-
ipate, or may be unable to participate due to technical
or logistical issues. The protocol should not require
advance knowledge of which parties will participate or
their quantity.
• Robustness: Incorrect or malformed data from even one
contributor destroys the value of aggregate analytics.
Hence, interfaces must proactively warn users about
spurious data. Furthermore, data analysts should have
some assistance in assembling algorithms that are robust
to outliers or common errors (one natural source of such
expertise might be the security experts, though it could
come from a distinct entity or toolchain).
Many of the existing protocols and tools discussed in
Section II can be wrapped, adapted, adopted, or translated into
a common infrastructure (using a shared modern language and
platform such as JavaScript and Node.js) that arranges them
into role variants that satisfy different combinations of the
requirements enumerated above (and that can be inhabited by
different agents). However, substantial software engineering
efforts may be required to do so; in many cases a frame-
work’s authors explicitly discourage direct use of their tools
in production [6], [8], [9], [31], [34].
B. Accessibility and Composability.
With regard in particular to accessibility: we believe that
there is no “one size fits all” accessibility measurement. Differ-
ent agents in the ecosystem have different usability concerns.
For example, different potential participants “speak” different
(programming) languages: distributed systems engineers on
the cloud speak Spark, data analysts speak R, and lawyers
and privacy experts speak their own less-structured languages.
As a result, one of the most important accessibility metrics is
the participants’ ability not to be burdened by understanding
the actions and responsibilities of roles they do not inhabit.
Consequently, the viability and success of such an ecosys-
tem depends on the secure distributed applications being com-
posable at the software and algorithmic layers. Composability
allows each participant to use and build upon prior contribu-
tions while only learning succinct API-level specifications of
functionality and security. It also facilitates upgrading: if one
component is improved, all derived software packages gain its
benefits too.
As we mentioned in Section III, policy agnostic program-
ming [46]–[48] can provide composability at the software
layer. At the algorithmic layer, one way to provide separation
of responsibilities is via universal composability (UC) [49].
UC has been specialized and simplified for the MPC setting
[50], and the potential value of UC has been shown throughout
the computing stack [51]–[53].
C. Assisted Design.
Our proposed ecosystem consists of several frameworks and
tools that facilitate and assist in the design, analysis, and
deployment of MPC systems. In particular, we envision a set
of tools that utilize information about the roles provided by the
system designers and various participating parties, to generate
parts of the system, analyses the efficiency of its protocols,
and manage and deploy its components.
Given a component or a protocol of an MPC system, as
well as auxiliary information about the roles and capabilities
of the different parties, a static analysis tool may calculate
an estimated performance evaluation, which may be used to
determine the different trade-offs in costs in various settings.
The system may make black-box usage of some primitive
or functionality, this functionality may be achieved using
a variety of protocols (e.g., PRF protocols [54], protocols
for generating multiplication triplets in Preprocessing [55],
each protocol relies on different assumptions or models (e.g.
preprocessing model), and the computation or communication
complexity of these protocol may grow differently on different
set of parameters (e.g. number of bits, number of parties). The
performance evaluation tool can produce various metrics and
charts (e.g. number of messages as a function of the number
of parties or size of the input) that help the designers choose
the optimal underlying protocols.
Additionally, the ecosystem can contain a knowledge base
containing a variety of popular protocols for generic primitives
or functionality (e.g., comparisons, encryption, sorting, and
so on). The knowledge base encodes the various properties
and assumptions of these protocols. An automated tool may
search the knowledge base to find suitable protocols given
information about the roles of the parties and their privacy
policies. The performance evaluation tool can be utilized to
automatically determine which implementation of the primi-
tives to use, or to reduce the number of choices the designer
has to manually analyze. There has been recent advances in
this direction [43], where a large knowledge base spanning
over 180 papers from the literature was compiled in addition
to several metrics for comparing MPC protocols.
This separation introduces the possibility of synthesizing
potential compatible policies from analysis algorithm defini-
tions [55] or interviews of data contributors [56]. The policy
expert could then take on the task of evaluating or curating
such policies. The policies can be encoded in a format that the
framework understands, as well as a human-friendly format
which the system displays to the data contributors before they
submit their data.
D. Incentives: the Ecosystem as a Marketplace.
The population of the role-based ecosystem with appropri-
ate, scalable, and usable MPC systems, applications, tools,
and libraries provides an opportunity to explicitly address
and leverage the incentives that may drive the agents that
inhabit various roles. This naturally suggests the notion of
a marketplace, and such a framing mechanism can further
motivate, delineate, and constrain development efforts.
The major challenges of populating the marketplace, in our
opinion, lie less with the design of faster MPC algorithmic
building blocks but with developing developer- and user-
centric software packages that span the range of possible
security, usability, and performance trade-offs. Interfacing with
existing languages and platforms already in widespread use
within the community allows use of existing code distribution
infrastructures and enables a broader population of users to
participate immediately.
We use the term marketplace because a successful ecosys-
tem must provide rational incentives for parties to interact.
The multiplier effect of composition is not merely a benefit
to software engineers but an incentive to deliver modular
code in the first place (a principle that is well-known to
all software engineers but is sorely lacking in the security
domain). The marketplace must also incentivize data owners,
who have not yet contributed data, to make their data available
for secure analyses (e.g., by giving responses quicker [57] or
more accurately to those who provide more data). Additionally,
data owners can secret-share their data with a custom privacy
policy, so that many computations may utilize their data in
the future, given that the stated policy of the computation
respects the policy of the data owners. Data owners may
be compensated for providing valuable data (monetarily or
otherwise), and the value of the data can be determined
under MPC without compromising its confidentiality. Next, by
being open to (and in some cases requiring) multiple compute
service providers [58], our vision reduces the current cloud
computing incentives toward vendor lock-in and instead favors
compute service providers who compete and specialize in
areas like trusted client application code delivery, untrusted
high-performance computing, data analysis, policy synthesis,
and reliable data delivery. Finally, a marketplace allows for
new types of actors to emerge who broker the exchange
of information or offer suggested advice on privacy policies
governing this exchange. This has the effect of further reducing
barriers to entry: data contributors and analysts may not need
to work as hard to understand the details of MPC in order
to receive its benefits (as others may be incentivized to help
them understand or to shield them from having to do so).
Finally, we observe that such a marketplace model naturally
points to mechanism design [59], [60] as an important area
of MPC research–one that can lead to opportunities to exploit
the benefits of secure computing for maximal social good.
V. USE CASES IN THE ECOSYSTEM CONTEXT
The recommendations in this report are in part informed by
planning, development, and deployment efforts on a number of
real-world applications (including each of our own MPC de-
ployment experiences [10], [22], [24] and development efforts
[61]) with a need for accessible, secure analytics solutions that
are critical to their missions. We briefly discuss three use cases
within the context of the proposed role-based ecosystem.
A. MPC For Tax Fraud Detection
In 2013, estimates quantified Estonia’s losses over VAT
evasion at 220 millions euros a year. Companies offered
resistance against legislation that required them to declare their
purchase and sales invoices to tax authorities, both due to the
sensitive nature of this data and due to the burden it places on
companies to curate the data. An MPC system for detecting
such evasion was proposed as a way to protect companies’
confidentiality [15]. Companies use the system to secret share
their VAT declarations, which are then analyzed under MPC
to calculate risk scores associated with each company. The
results are then revealed to the Estonian Tax and Customs
Board (MTA). The system was presented to decision makers
at the MTA, who understood the value of utilizing MPC in this
application and considered using MPC for future applications.
However, the MPC system was not adopted.
This use case offers a variety of interesting insights into the
importance of the role-based ecosystem and its benefits. The
companies with VAT declarations are the data contributors in
this system; they secret share their declarations to the compute
parties, who then execute the MPC analysis. The companies do
not participate in the analysis and are not required to operate
a sophisticated computing stack or powerful hardware; this is
consistent with their concerns about the burden of maintaining
or acquiring appropriate resources and expertise. The two
main compute parties between whom trust is federated are the
MTA and the Estonian Trade Association (ETA). These two
parties can be trusted not to collude because their respective
incentives are entirely different: the MTA is a government
agency concerned with detecting tax fraud, while the ETA is a
representative body of the companies (data contributors) that
is concerned with protecting their privacy and interests. The
Information Systems and Registers Center (under the Estonian
Justice Department) is the third compute party. Although the
third party is also trusted not to collude with the others
due to incentives and various organizational independence
requirements, the authors explicitly stated that its participation
improves performance: having three compute parties increases
efficiency by enabling the use of more optimized MPC pro-
tocols (the Sharemind framework also requires exactly three
compute parties [7]). The MTA is the analyst (since it specifies
the analytics to compute) and the recipient of the results
of the computation. Additionally, the MTA plays the role
of a decision maker: the MPC protocols and their security
guarantees had to be explained to the MTA, and the MTA
raised multiple concerns about the system.
The authors state that two concerns unique to the MTA
hindered the adoption of their MPC system: (1) the per-
formance of their system was considerably slower than that
of a non-MPC system (processing 30 days of VAT data
would require spending about 10 days on the computation,
as opposed to three days using the non-MPC system), and
(2) the MTA was concerned about the transparency of the
risk scoring algorithms (since the other compute parties must
jointly execute the algorithms using MPC, they must know the
code describing the algorithms).
The authors attempted to utilize the capabilities and in-
centives of the participating parties to argue against these
two concerns. First, the protocol was split into two stages to
increase efficiency: (1) a parallel MPC task executed by each
contributing company to aggregate that company’s data, and
(2) a global aggregation and analysis task. This optimization
is possible for two reasons: the desired analytics can be paral-
lelized by input company before the global aggregation takes
place, and the compute parties are capable of acquiring and
managing a powerful computing infrastructure. Second, the
authors argued that transparency can improve the acceptance
of the MPC system, since the ETA and other companies can
inspect the analysis algorithms. The MTA agreed that the
transparency and auditability of the MPC system is a step
towards incentivizing tax payers to think of paying taxes as
a social obligation at the grassroots level. However, the MTA
remained concerned about the changes that would need to be
instituted across the analysis process in order to enable sharing
of risk analysis algorithms with other parties.
Both of these attempts can be understood through the lens
of the role inventory and dimensions discussed in Section III.
This highlights the importance of designing and deploying
MPC solutions while maintaining a role-based perspective,
as this can help stakeholders enumerate possible alternatives
when incentives are misaligned, can help drive adoption of
MPC, and can more explicitly guide selection of improvements
to the quality of MPC systems (e.g., in terms of their usability
and/or efficiency). The MTA’s concerns about transparency
exemplify an interesting tension between the auditability of
software and the incentives some parties have to keep their
analysis algorithms secret. This raises the possibility of de-
veloping MPC protocols where the program itself is garbled
as part of the input (potentially at the cost of efficiency): the
generic protocol can be auditable and public, but the inputs
and program can be secret. Such a protocol might need to
analyze the program to confirm that it satisfies necessary
privacy policies (without revealing it or running it on inputs).
B. Accessible MPC for Privacy-Preserving Data Analytics.
In 2013, the Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC)
[62] initiated a study of wage gaps among employers within
Greater Boston. Uniquely, they planned to use employer-
provided data from over over 200 companies to quantify and
track progress over time [63]. For an organization, participat-
ing in the tracking portion involves aggregating data internally
and then contributing that data to a computation across all
organizations. The BWWC’s efforts were initially stymied by
privacy and legal barriers to sharing of sensitive payroll data.
Companies refused to submit data to a “trusted third party”,
and conversely the BWWC had difficulties recruiting an entity
to serve in a trusted data collection role due to the risk of
being held liable by Compact signers if the payroll data were
accidentally leaked or breached. Ultimately, the BWWC used
a web-based MPC system for three data analysis sessions to
collect payroll analytics securely, thus sidestepping the legal
risks involved in handling payroll data [64]. This system used
a lightweight solution: a simple browser-based application that
could accommodate the familiar look and feel of a spreadsheet
[22], with transparent open-source code to enable outside
auditing. A variant of a simple, well-known protocol [23],
[65] met users’ needs and was just expressive enough for the
deployment scenario while still being comprehensible enough
for key decision makers to feel comfortable.
In this scenario, the signing companies play the role of data
contributors (and, indirectly, recipients). The BWWC is the
analyst and also a recipient, viewing the employee earnings to-
tals aggregated across all companies while individual company
aggregates remain private. The BWWC’s collaborating partner
(i.e., Boston University) facilitates the private aggregation by
supplying the personnel (thus fulfilling the policy expert role)
and by installing and running the application back-end on
an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud-based server (thus
acting together with AWS as a compute service provider). The
latter arrangement also means that AWS acts as the sole code
distributor. The Internet is the communications medium, with
secure end-to-end communications achieved via TLS.
The choice of MPC protocol was determined by negotiation
and reconciliation of a number of trade-offs and constraints,
including which of the roles from Section III participants could
inhabit and which of the requirements listed in Section IV-A
had to be satisfied. An asynchronous variant of a secret-sharing
protocol was used that allows multiple parties to collectively
compute a sum of their individual quantities [65]. This solu-
tion was comprehensible, required only one compute service
provider, did not burden the data contributors or recipient, and
had acceptable performance characteristics. However, it was
also limited in its expressiveness and in its security guarantees:
(1) it only allowed for the computation of linear combinations
on the input data and (2) it did not protect against collusion
between the compute party and recipient.
This experience showed that for data contributors and recip-
ients the computational efficiency of the MPC component is
not the primary performance bottleneck. For simple analytics
over relatively small sets of data, all modern frameworks
perform rather well (i.e., seconds to minutes) [20]. However,
other seemingly unrelated considerations such as choice of
client-side cryptographic library have a substantial effect [64].
Furthermore, human time can dominate computing time when
a window spanning multiple days is required to collect data
from a large number of human contributors with incompatible
schedules; asynchrony was an essential protocol feature.
Passive (also known as semi-honest) security [66] suffices in
this scenario because incentives derived from existing privacy
laws are leveraged: the service provider and analyst lack
any clear incentive to falsify the results of the aggregation
or to learn private input data. To the contrary, completing
the study successfully is directly beneficial to the BWWC
(as the initiator of the study) as well as to the compute
service provider (as an institution reliant upon a reputation
of integrity). Additionally, obtaining any of the contributors’
private data would create a liability risk for the service
provider and analyst (as would any other type of collusion).
Thus, the passive model is natural in this case: the service
providers are protected from the usual legal risks of processing
sensitive data so long as the parties follow the protocol.
An important insight from this deployment was the recog-
nition (through discussions with data contributors about the
potential attack surfaces of the software application) that one
of the compute service providers and the code distributor
were one and the same. It was recognized that this risk can
be mitigated by federating the code distribution service itself
using MPC [45].
In a similar use case to that of the BWWC, the Greater
Boston Chamber of Commerce (GBCC) launched an economic
inclusion initiative called Pacesetters in 2018 [10]. The goal of
the initiative is to track (in aggregate) corporate spending on
contracts with minority and female-owned businesses within
the region. As part of the initiative, companies must contribute
information about their spending on a national, state, and local
level. MPC is used to derive global insights on corporate
spending toward minority and female-owned businesses. The
same web-based MPC software is used for this initiative,
demonstrating ease of re-usability and how a generalizable
solution can arise from this design and development process.
C. Scalable MPC Supporting Heterogeneous Data Stacks.
The goal of our Conclave framework [61], [67] is to
enable deployment of MPC in scenarios that involve multiple
organizations that want to collectively analyze their large data
sets. The roles of data contributor and compute service are
inhabited by the same entities, and the framework assumes that
all parties have the capacity (in terms of access to hardware
resources and of availability of software frameworks such
as Hadoop) both to store large data sets and to compute
over them. Conclave is explicitly designed to exploit this
assumption to enhance performance: a data query workflow
is optimized to use the local computing resources available to
each party as much as possible (limiting MPC computation
and communication overhead to only the part of the workflow
for which it is essential).
In terms of usability, this framework seeks to eliminate the
burden on data contributors who also act as compute parties
of tasking their in-house software developers and IT adminis-
trators with adopting brand new data storage and computation
stacks. The design also seeks to allow data analysts to use
a familiar data analysis language rather than learning a new
domain-specific language, and to avoid dealing with the issue
of data sharing policies (which should be the domain of the
data contributors or policy experts).
Conclave is also designed to support the separation of a
policy expert (who specifies what data is sensitive and must
remain private) from a data analyst (who specifies the data
query). The data contributors specify which columns in their
contributed data sets are sensitive and must remain private.
They can do so without prior knowledge of the query that will
be applied to the data sets. At the same time, the automated
process that Conclave uses to identify which portion of a
computation must utilize MPC allows the query itself to be
agnostic with respect to the policies that govern the input data
sets. Thus, the author of a query need not be a policy (or
cryptography) expert; they only need to concern themselves
with authoring the query as if the data is available in the clear.
Also particularly relevant is Conclave’s ability to improve
an expensive MPC computation’s performance via the intro-
duction of a selectively trusted party (STP). If directed to
do so, Conclave can expose the plaintext values of some
columns in the data to the STP in order to achieve significant
performance improvements [61], [68]. Such a party may exist
for a number of reasons within a deployment scenario. For
example, certain organizations that act as STPs may choose
to establish legal relationships with the data contributors via
non-disclosure agreements or other mechanisms. If MPC is
being used to mitigate liability, such organizations may choose
to take advantage of insurance and to offer their computing
resources in order to improve the performance of third-party
MPC computations in which they have no interest otherwise.
More generally, Conclave’s features can be viewed as
enabling the navigation of policy-performance trade-offs for
expensive MPC computations over large data sets. This is ac-
complished by exploiting asymmetries in the cost and privacy
constraints among the compute parties. Note the manner in
which Conclave’s target use cases are distinguished from the
previous category of web-based data analytics application use
cases: Conclave targets scenarios in which the organizations
inhabit the same roles but may have different cost and privacy
constraints, while the former software applications target sce-
narios in which the organizations necessarily inhabit different
roles due to resource constraints but mostly have identical
security constraints.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have introduced a collection of organizing
principles and a conceptual framework for identifying, charac-
terizing, and effectively addressing scenarios that can benefit
from the introduction of MPC technologies. We have also
shown how this approach can be used to model and examine
past attempts to deploy MPC.
The proposed model can help guide future directions in
several areas of fundamental research. Work on new MPC
primitives, protocols, and technologies can explicitly disen-
tangle roles, concerns, incentives, and capabilities and can
aim to provide a modular collection of building blocks that
can be used to address regions of the scenario space. Work
can also explore the compositionality of protocols along these
new dimensions. Formal modeling and analysis of protocol
definitions can incorporate these concepts, and work on static
analysis techniques can explore how policy agnostic program-
ming and related approaches can enable the level of modularity
necessary to support the envisioned ecosystem.
On the implementation and deployment end, the concepts
presented can provide a starting point for the vocabulary used
within standards and APIs of software solutions that utilize or
enable MPC. Designs of open source MPC libraries can aim to
support the full range of scenarios, or particular subsets that
represent interesting or valuable trade-offs between privacy,
liability, performance, and other metrics relevant to a scenario.
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